聯(lián)邦法院禁止USPTO依據(jù)§145條請(qǐng)求獲得地區(qū)法院訴訟中的律師費(fèi)補(bǔ)償

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發(fā)布：IPRdaily中文網(wǎng)（IPRdaily.cn）

作者：A. John Murray律師 及Kent E. Genin律師

供稿：Brinks Gilson & Lione律師事務(wù)所

原標(biāo)題：聯(lián)邦巡回法院全席審理禁止美國(guó)專(zhuān)利及商標(biāo)局依據(jù)§145條請(qǐng)求獲得地區(qū)法院訴訟中的律師費(fèi)補(bǔ)償 - Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu, No. 2016-1794 (Fed. Cir. July 27, 2018)(en banc)

本文案件中，聯(lián)邦巡回法院經(jīng)全院審理后認(rèn)為，專(zhuān)利申請(qǐng)人如援引專(zhuān)利法§ 145條于地區(qū)法院對(duì)專(zhuān)利審查與上訴委員會(huì)的裁決進(jìn)行挑戰(zhàn)，依據(jù)“美國(guó)規(guī)則”中訴訟雙方各自承擔(dān)本方律師費(fèi)原則，專(zhuān)利申請(qǐng)人無(wú)需支付PTO的律師費(fèi)用。全院審理中4票反對(duì)意見(jiàn)則支持國(guó)會(huì)在制定§ 145條時(shí)已具體明確了申請(qǐng)人應(yīng)承擔(dān)“訴訟所有花費(fèi)”。本案很可能在未來(lái)得到最高法院就此問(wèn)題的最終裁決。

近期，聯(lián)邦巡回法院經(jīng)全院審理（en banc）后駁回了美國(guó)專(zhuān)利及商標(biāo)局（United States Patent and Trademark Office , PTO）的以下論點(diǎn)：在地區(qū)法院為審查員駁回申請(qǐng)作出成功辯護(hù)后，未成功的申請(qǐng)人需強(qiáng)令支付PTO的律師費(fèi)。

當(dāng)PTO的專(zhuān)利審查與上訴委員會(huì)（Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Board）做出維持審查員駁回專(zhuān)利申請(qǐng)的裁決后，美國(guó)專(zhuān)利法 § 145條允許申請(qǐng)人在地區(qū)法院對(duì)委員會(huì)的裁決進(jìn)行挑戰(zhàn)。申請(qǐng)人如援引§ 145條則被要求支付PTO為委員會(huì)裁決進(jìn)行辯護(hù)所產(chǎn)生的全部訴訟花費(fèi)（all the expenses of the proceedings），無(wú)論訴訟結(jié)果為何。

從歷史上來(lái)看，PTO依據(jù)這一條規(guī)定來(lái)彌補(bǔ)其在公務(wù)差旅和印刷上的總花費(fèi)，近期還包括專(zhuān)家證人的費(fèi)用。

本案中，法院所需解答的問(wèn)題為§ 145條是否也強(qiáng)令申請(qǐng)人支付PTO產(chǎn)生的律師費(fèi)用。

本案的專(zhuān)利申請(qǐng)包含一種使用自然殺手細(xì)胞治療癌癥的方法。2010年，PTO的審查員基于顯而易見(jiàn)性駁回申請(qǐng)，2013年委員會(huì)做出維持審查員駁回的裁決。依據(jù)§145條，NantKwest于美國(guó)弗吉尼亞州東區(qū)地方法院對(duì)委員會(huì)的裁決發(fā)起挑戰(zhàn)。在地區(qū)法院的審理中，PTO成功獲得申請(qǐng)人的權(quán)利要求具有顯而易見(jiàn)性的簡(jiǎn)易判決。PTO隨后提交了一項(xiàng)依據(jù)§145條對(duì)訴訟花費(fèi)報(bào)銷(xiāo)的動(dòng)議，報(bào)銷(xiāo)費(fèi)用中包含PTO的律師費(fèi)。

地區(qū)法院駁回PTO動(dòng)議中涉及律師費(fèi)報(bào)銷(xiāo)的請(qǐng)求，法院援引“美國(guó)規(guī)則（American Rule）”：在沒(méi)有國(guó)會(huì)明確相反的指令下，訴訟各方承擔(dān)自己的律師費(fèi)用。PTO對(duì)此上訴，由聯(lián)邦巡回法院三位法官組成的合議庭推翻了地區(qū)法院的裁決。法院之后依職權(quán)下令（sua sponte）對(duì)上訴案進(jìn)行全院審理（en bance）并撤銷(xiāo)合議庭裁決。法院要求就一個(gè)問(wèn)題進(jìn)行概述：合議庭依據(jù)§ 145條的“全部訴訟花費(fèi)”規(guī)定授予獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)PTO律師費(fèi)的裁決是否正確。

法院首先認(rèn)為“美國(guó)規(guī)則”可適用于§ 145條。在此過(guò)程中法院駁回了PTO的論點(diǎn) - § 145條不是在“美國(guó)規(guī)則”范圍內(nèi)的費(fèi)用轉(zhuǎn)移法規(guī)（fee-shifting statute）。PTO依賴(lài)第四巡回法院在Shammas v. Focarino案中的意見(jiàn)：“美國(guó)規(guī)則”僅適用于將費(fèi)用從勝訴方轉(zhuǎn)移至敗訴方的法規(guī)解釋。

因?yàn)椤?145條強(qiáng)令申請(qǐng)人支付“所有花費(fèi)”，無(wú)論訴訟輸贏，所以PTO主張這并不屬于在“美國(guó)規(guī)則”范圍內(nèi)的費(fèi)用轉(zhuǎn)移法規(guī)。法院審議了第四巡回法院的觀點(diǎn) -“美國(guó)規(guī)則”不適用于對(duì)訴訟勝訴缺乏要求的法規(guī)，認(rèn)為這是錯(cuò)誤的。

法院認(rèn)為§ 145條所陳述的“申請(qǐng)人應(yīng)支付訴訟的所有花費(fèi)”缺乏取代“美國(guó)規(guī)則”所需之“具體和明確（specific and explicit）”的國(guó)會(huì)授權(quán)?！熬唧w和明確”要求需要“超越僅僅在語(yǔ)言上和有時(shí)被廣泛使用地隱含式支付（implicitly cover）律師費(fèi)用?！狈ㄔ簩徸h了其他國(guó)會(huì)制定的法律條款，并得出結(jié)論這些條款證明了在通常情況下，業(yè)務(wù)津貼法定權(quán)利不包括隱含式授權(quán)獎(jiǎng)賞律師費(fèi)用。

首席法官 Prost撰寫(xiě)了一篇長(zhǎng)幅反對(duì)意見(jiàn)，她的三位同事也加入其中。反對(duì)意見(jiàn)認(rèn)為當(dāng)國(guó)會(huì)說(shuō)“全部花費(fèi)”既意味著所有的支出。反對(duì)意見(jiàn)指出PTO沒(méi)有聘請(qǐng)外部法律顧問(wèn)以協(xié)助對(duì)§ 145條訴訟的辯護(hù)。相反，PTO使用領(lǐng)取政府薪金的律師。這些律師所產(chǎn)生的費(fèi)用，是因?yàn)橥度氡景杆ㄙM(fèi)的時(shí)間使其不可進(jìn)行其他工作。

反對(duì)意見(jiàn)認(rèn)為§ 145條的法律語(yǔ)言表明了國(guó)會(huì)“具體和明確”的使其與“美國(guó)規(guī)則”相分離之意圖，并強(qiáng)令申請(qǐng)人支付所有訴訟花費(fèi)，包括PTO的人事費(fèi)用。

截至目前，申請(qǐng)人援引§ 145條不要求支付PTO的律師費(fèi)。但如反對(duì)意見(jiàn)所示，多數(shù)意見(jiàn)已經(jīng)形成了與第四巡回法院在Shammas案中的意見(jiàn)分歧。這一點(diǎn)加之目前案件中的反對(duì)意見(jiàn)，增加了最高法院可就此問(wèn)題進(jìn)行最終裁決的可能性。

附：英文全文

En Banc Federal Circuit Bars USPTO's Recovery of Attorney Fees in §145 District Court Actions - Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu, No. 2016-1794 (Fed. Cir. July 27, 2018)(en banc)

On July 27, 2018, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, rejected the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s (“PTO’s”) argument that, following their successful defense of an examiner’s rejection in district court, the unsuccessful applicant is compelled to pay the PTO’s attorney fees. When the PTO’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) affirms an examiner’s rejection of a patent application, § 145 of the Patent Act permits the applicant to challenge the Board’s decision in district court. Applicants who invoke § 145 are required to pay “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings” incurred by the PTO in defending the Board’s decision, regardless of the outcome. Historically, the PTO has relied on this provision to recover sums it spent on travel and printing and, more recently, expert witnesses. In Nantkwest, the issue before the court was whether §145 also compelled the applicant to pay attorney fees incurred by the PTO.

The patent application at issue involved a method for treating cancer using natural killer cells. In 2010, a PTO examiner rejected the application as obvious and the Board affirmed the rejection in 2013. Pursuant to § 145, NantKwest challenged the Board’s decision in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Here, the PTO successfully moved for summary judgment that the application’s claims were obvious. The PTO then filed a motion for reimbursement of the expenses of the proceedings under § 145, including their attorney fees.

The district court denied the PTO’s motion with respect to attorney fees, citing the “American Rule”, i.e. that each litigant bears its own attorney fees absent clear contrary instruction from Congress. The PTO appealed and a divided panel of the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. Later, the court voted sua sponte to hear the appeal en banc and vacated the panel’s judgment. The court requested briefing on a single question: whether the panel correctly determined that § 145’s “all the expenses of the proceedings’ provision” authorizes an award of the PTO’s attorney fees.

The court first held that the American Rule applies to § 145. In doing so, the court rejected the PTO’s argument that § 145 is not a fee-shifting statute that falls within the American Rule’s ambit. The PTO had relied on the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Shammas v. Focarino, 784 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2015), for the proposition that the American Rule only governs the interpretation of statutes that shift fees from a prevailing party to a losing party. The Shammas case involved a provision from the Lanham Act that is “nearly identical” to § 145 of the Patent Act. Because § 145 imposes “[a]ll the expenses” on the applicant, win or lose, the PTO asserted it is not a fee-shifting statute that falls within the American Rule’s ambit. The court considered the Fourth Circuit’s view that the American Rule does not apply to statutes lacking a success requirement to be misplaced.

The court went on to hold that § 145’s recitation that “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant” lacks the “specific and explicit” congressional authorization required to displace the American Rule. The “specific and explicit” requirement demands “more than language that merely can be and is sometimes used broadly to implicitly cover attorneys’ fees.” (emphasis in original) The court reviewed other statutory provisions enacted by Congress and concluded that these demonstrated that ordinarily, a statutory right to expenses does not include an implicit authorization to award attorneys’ fees.

Chief Judge Prost authored a lengthy dissent, in which three of her colleagues joined. The dissent argued that when Congress said, “[a]ll the expenses,” they meant all the expenses. The dissent noted that the PTO did not retain outside counsel to assist in defending this § 145 action. Instead, it used its salaried government lawyers. These lawyers incurred expenses because the time they devoted to this case was not available for other work.

The dissent considered that the language of § 145 evinces Congress’s “specific and explicit” intent to depart from the American Rule and to impose upon the applicant payment of all the expenses of the proceedings, including the PTO’s personnel expenses.

For the present, applicants who invoke § 145 are not required to pay the PTO’s attorney fees. However, as noted by the dissent, the majority opinion has created a circuit split with the Fourth Circuit’s position in Shammas. This, together with the strong dissent in the present case, raises the possibility that the Supreme Court may have the final say as to this issue.

發(fā)布：IPRdaily中文網(wǎng)（IPRdaily.cn）

作者：A. John Murray律師 及Kent E. Genin律師

供稿：Brinks Gilson & Lione律師事務(wù)所

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