關(guān)于德國(guó)聯(lián)邦法院近期對(duì)Sisvel vs. 海爾案判決的最新評(píng)論

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來源：IPRdaily中文網(wǎng)（iprdaily.cn）

作者：Stephan Dorn, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer Germany

Corin Gittinger, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer Germany

Yujing Wang（王玉婧）, PECC-China

Jinping Gong（龔津平）, CocreateIP Germany

原標(biāo)題：關(guān)于德國(guó)聯(lián)邦法院近期對(duì)Sisvel vs. 海爾案判決的最新評(píng)論

德國(guó)聯(lián)邦法院（FCJ）近期剛剛發(fā)布了期待已久的對(duì)于Sisvel vs. Haier一案的判決。這是歐洲法院對(duì)華為 vs. 中興一案做出裁決后歐洲的首個(gè)最高法院判決。華為 vs. 中興一案的判決中，歐洲法院針對(duì)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)必要專利（SEP）侵權(quán)行為所致禁令的執(zhí)行建立了一個(gè)嚴(yán)格的多步驟行為機(jī)制（又被稱為the Huawei Dance）。

The German Federal Court of Justice (FCJ) has now published its long-awaited decision in the Sisvel vs. Haier case. This is the first supreme court decision after the ECJ's ruling in the Huawei vs. ZTE case, which established a strict multi-step behavioural regime (the Huawei Dance) for the enforcement of the injunction based on the infringement of an SEP.

關(guān)于本案 / Facts about the case

訴訟涉及的專利是歐洲專利852 885的德國(guó)生效專利，該歐洲專利于2005年獲得授權(quán)，隨后在德國(guó)生效。這個(gè)歐洲專利是PCT申請(qǐng)PCT/FI1996/000506而后進(jìn)入歐洲地區(qū)階段，并主張一項(xiàng)于1995年9月25日提交的芬蘭申請(qǐng)的優(yōu)先權(quán)。這個(gè)PCT申請(qǐng)于1996年9月25日提交，經(jīng)過WIPO的PATENTSCOPE著錄庫(kù)查詢得知，此項(xiàng)PCT申請(qǐng)后來進(jìn)入了中國(guó)、歐洲專利局、新西蘭、加拿大、日本、挪威和美國(guó)。

The patent in suit is a German part of a European Patent 852 885 which was granted in 2005 and subsequently validated in Germany. This EP patent resulted from a regional entry of a PCT application PCT/FI1996/000506 claiming priority from a Finnish application filed on September 25, 1995. This PCT application was filed on September 25, 1996. From the PATENTSCOPE registry, this PCT application later had entered China, European Patent Office, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, Norway and the USA.

PCT申請(qǐng)PCT/FI1996/000506（包括在芬蘭的優(yōu)先權(quán)申請(qǐng)）的原始申請(qǐng)人是諾基亞電信公司（芬蘭），中間在歐洲專利的審查過程中登記了申請(qǐng)人的變更（起因是諾基亞內(nèi)部數(shù)個(gè)子公司的合并）。隨后，SISVEL公司于2012年8月8日獲得了其對(duì)涉案歐洲專利（EP）852 885號(hào)的德國(guó)生效專利的所有權(quán)，并在此之后，直到該專利于2016年9月25號(hào)失效之前一直作為此專利的專利權(quán)人。

The original applicant of the PCT application PCT/FI1996/000506 including the Finnish priority application is Nokia Telecommunications OY (Finland). SISVEL International S.A. registered its ownership of the German part of the granted EP patent 852 885 on August 8, 2012 and acted as the proprietor until the patent term was expired on September 25, 2016.

經(jīng)過在歐洲專利局7年的審查，EP 852 885號(hào)專利于2005年11月16號(hào)被公告授權(quán)。在該歐洲專利申請(qǐng)審查期間，沒有任何第三方意見被提出。關(guān)于該專利的9個(gè)月異議期于2006年8月16日結(jié)束，也就在這一天，高通公司對(duì)此項(xiàng)被授予的EP專利提出了異議。但高通公司于2008年10月7日致函歐洲專利局撤回了他們的異議意見。2008年11月21日，歐洲專利局發(fā)出了一項(xiàng)終止異議程序的決定。

The mentioned of the grant for European Patent 852 885 was published in the European Patent Bulletin 16.11.2005, after 7 years of prosecution in the EPO. No third-party observation was filed in the EPO during the prosecution history. The 9-month opposition period for this patent ends at 16.08.2006 on which a notice of Opposition was filed to against this granted EP patent. The opponent was QUALCOMM INCORPORATED. QUALCOMM withdrawn their opposition by a letter of 07.10.2008. A decision to discontinue the opposition proceedings on Nov. 21, 2008 was released by the EPO.

此前，在專利有效期即將到期之前，曾有一起針對(duì)EP852 885德國(guó)生效專利的無效訴訟。德國(guó)聯(lián)邦法院（FCJ）于2020年3月10日確認(rèn)了EP852 885號(hào)專利的有效性。隨后FCJ還確認(rèn)了Sisvel持有的另一項(xiàng)專利EP 1 264 504有效。

Previously, a nullity action was taken to the German part of EP852 885 just before the patent term was going to expire. The German Federal Supreme Court (BGH) confirmed the validity of EP852885 on March 10, 2020 and subsequently BGH has also confirmed another patent EP 1 264 504 from Sisvel to be valid.

關(guān)于此案判決和其主要考慮因素 / About the decision and the main considerations

正如預(yù)料當(dāng)中的那樣，F(xiàn)CJ提出的理由給專利實(shí)施者帶來了更大的負(fù)擔(dān)。它強(qiáng)調(diào)了實(shí)施者有義務(wù)參與并推進(jìn)許可談判，并表明其真實(shí)有意愿接受FRAND許可——“無論什么條件下的FRAND”。在這方面，F(xiàn)CJ明確提及了英國(guó)判例法（英國(guó)高等法院，Birss法官，[2017]EWHC 711（pat），Unwired Planet vs. Huawei，mn. 708）中使用過的“無論什么條件下的FRAND”（“on whatever terms are FRAND”）的語言。

As expected the reasoning of the FCJ places a higher burden on the implementer and emphasises the implementer’s duty to advance the license negotiations and show its true willingness to take a FRAND-license, “on whatever terms are in fact FRAND”. In this regard the FCJ explicitly refers to the UK case law (UK High Court of Justice, Judge Birss, [2017] EWHC 711 (pat), Unwired Planet vs. Huawei, mn. 708) which coined the “on whatever terms are FRAND” language.

然而，F(xiàn)CJ在判決中使用歐盟法院對(duì)于華為 vs. 中興一案的案例法，并不像人們可能擔(dān)心的那樣（基于口頭聽證會(huì)和聽證會(huì)后對(duì)于德國(guó)專利訴訟趨勢(shì)的傳言），對(duì)專利實(shí)施者那么的不利。相反，針對(duì)專利權(quán)人和實(shí)施者在評(píng)估許可條件是否FRAND時(shí)雙方之間存在的信息不對(duì)稱這一問題，F(xiàn)CJ還提出了一些關(guān)于專利權(quán)人的基本義務(wù)的積極陳述。

However, the FCJ’s adoption of the Huawei vs. ZTE case law by the CJEU is not as negative for implementers as one might have feared based on the oral hearing and the rumours purported in the German patent litigation scene right after the hearing. Rather, the FCJ’s reasoning also contains some positive statements on the basic obligations the patent proprietor has in view of the asymmetry of information between the patent proprietor and the implementer when assessing the FRANDness of the offer.

I.    FCJ’s basic considerations /德國(guó)聯(lián)邦法院的基本考慮

FCJ對(duì)FRAND抗辯的解釋，更趨近于所謂橙皮書一案所建立的針對(duì)反壟斷法下對(duì)于強(qiáng)制許可的異議的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)框架的“嚴(yán)格版本”（橙皮書標(biāo)準(zhǔn)判決是FCJ在歐盟法院的華為 vs. 中興案之前作出過的一項(xiàng)具有標(biāo)志性意義的裁決）：

The FCJ interprets the FRAND defence closer to the stricter so-called Orange-Book-Standard framework for antitrust law driven compulsory license objections (the Orange-Book-Standard decision is the FCJ’s landmark decision prior to the Huawei vs. ZTE case law by the CJEU):

首先，F(xiàn)CJ重申，正如歐盟法院在華為 vs. 中興案中所述，以涉嫌侵犯標(biāo)準(zhǔn)必要專利為由提出禁令救濟(jì)、召回和銷毀的要求，本身并不違反反壟斷法。這是因?yàn)?，具有市?chǎng)主導(dǎo)地位的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)必要專利所有者不會(huì)要求實(shí)施者簽訂許可協(xié)議，也無法強(qiáng)制實(shí)施者獲得許可。相反，實(shí)施者應(yīng)當(dāng)提出要約以獲取FRAND許可。因此，根據(jù)先前BGH的判決(mn. 70)，對(duì)于那些使用專利并不愿意獲取許可的侵權(quán)者，專利權(quán)人有權(quán)依據(jù)專利侵權(quán)行為提出包括禁令救濟(jì)的主張。

As a starting point, the FCJ reiterates, that it is not per se a violation of antitrust law to claim injunctive relief, recall and destruction based on alleged infringement of an SEP just like the CJEU had stated in Huawei vs. ZTE. That is because, the market-dominant SEP owner would not have a claim against an implementer to conclude a license agreement and would not be able to force an implementer to take a license. The implementer, however, would have such a claim to obtain a FRAND-license. Therefore, the patentee would be left with asserting his claims based on patent infringement (i.e. also the claim for injunctive relief) against those parties who use the patent but are not willing to conclude a license according to the BGH (mn. 70).

FCJ接著指出，關(guān)于禁令救濟(jì)、召回和銷毀的主張只會(huì)在第102 號(hào)歐盟運(yùn)作條約下被認(rèn)定為被濫用：

The FCJ then goes on to state that the assertion of claims for injunctive relief, recall and destruction would only be abusive under Art. 102 TFEU：

（1） … 如果尋求許可者提出了無條件的許可要約，那么專利權(quán)人不得拒絕以不違反禁止濫用或歧視的條例（在橙皮書標(biāo)準(zhǔn)判決中no. 71）。

（2） … 如果專利權(quán)人在專利使用者被證明愿意在合理的條件下達(dá)成許可協(xié)議后沒有為達(dá)成許可做出必要的舉措（nm. 72）。

(1)        … if the license seeker provides an unconditional offer, that the patentee must not decline without infringing the prohibition of abuse or discrimination (no. 71 which is the old Orange-Book standard) or,

(2)        … if the patentee has not taken the necessary steps to conclude a license agreement with a standard user that has proven to be willing to conclude such a license agreement at reasonable terms (nm. 72).

II.  Implementer’s willingness to license / 專利實(shí)施者接受許可的意愿

FCJ在這一方面表示，在華為 vs. 中興一案的框架內(nèi)，許可尋求者需要清晰、明確地表明其愿意以FRAND作為基礎(chǔ)與標(biāo)準(zhǔn)必要專利所有人達(dá)成許可協(xié)議。因?yàn)椤耙粋€(gè)愿意接受許可的被許可人必須是在任何條款下均愿意獲取FRAND許可的，只要該條款事實(shí)上是FRAND的。（“a willing licensee must be one willing to take a FRAND license on whatever terms are in fact FRAND.”）

From that second category the FCJ follows that within the Huawei vs. ZTE framework, the license seeker would need to clearly and unambiguously show its willingness to conclude a license with the SEP-holder at FRAND-terms. Because “a willing licensee must be one willing to take a FRAND licence on whatever terms are in fact FRAND.”

FCJ的這些考慮使其與杜塞爾多夫法院對(duì)華為 vs. 中興案例法的采用產(chǎn)生了實(shí)質(zhì)性的偏差。杜塞爾多夫法院認(rèn)為，依據(jù)歐盟法院華為 vs. 中興一案的案例法，雙方達(dá)成許可的必要步驟是連續(xù)性的并由相互替換的職責(zé)構(gòu)成。只有在另一方完全履行了其先前義務(wù)的情況下，才會(huì)產(chǎn)生下一步的交替性的職責(zé)。曼海姆法院和最近慕尼黑法院（在其指導(dǎo)方針中）對(duì)FRAND抗辯也偏離了歐盟法院在華為訴中興一案的判決中所要求嚴(yán)格遵循的一系列步驟。

The FCJ’s basic considerations lead to a substantial deviation from the Dusseldorf court’s adoption of the Huawei vs. ZTE case law. The Dusseldorf courts considered the necessary steps under Huawei vs. ZTE CJEU case law as consecutive and mutual sequence of duties which only arise if the respective preceding obligation is completely fulfilled by the other party. The Mannheim and recently the Munich court (in its guidelines) already appeared shifting away from assessing the FRAND defence in view of adherence to the strict sequence of the steps required under CJEU’s Huawei vs. ZTE decision.

對(duì)于尋求許可者來說，這里關(guān)鍵的一點(diǎn)是，對(duì)SEP所有者問詢的任何回應(yīng)都應(yīng)該是清晰明確的。它不應(yīng)該被置于任何條件下，且無論許可人對(duì)于給定專利組合提出的FRAND條款是什么，被許可人都應(yīng)該清晰地表達(dá)出自己尋求FRAND許可的意愿。

The key takeaway for any license seeker here is that any response to inquiries from SEP-owners should be clear and unambiguous. It should not be placed under any conditions and it must convey the clear message that the license seeker would be willing to take a FRAND-licences, whatever the FRAND-terms for the respective portfolio in the given case would be.

III.  SEP-owners obligation to provide information on its licensing practice /  SEP所有者有義務(wù)提供其許可實(shí)踐的有關(guān)信息

FCJ強(qiáng)調(diào)，SEP所有者“可能需要為其提出的許可要求提供詳細(xì)的理由，以使尋求許可者能夠證實(shí)其許可要求不構(gòu)成支配地位的濫用”，例如，其所提供的條款和條件是否實(shí)際上符合FRAND原則。否則，愿意獲得許可的公司將被迫承擔(dān)被命令停止和終止所有侵權(quán)行為的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，或被迫接受可能濫用專利所有人權(quán)利的過高的許可費(fèi)或其他潛在的不公平的合同條件，以規(guī)避禁令的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”（mn. 76）。

The FCJ emphasizes that the SEP-owner “may be required to provide a detailed justification for its license claims in order to enable the person willing to take a license to verify whether the license claim constitutes an abuse of a dominant position”, i.e. whether the terms and conditions offered are in fact FRAND. For otherwise, ‘the company willing to take a license would be forced to either take the risk of being ordered to cease and desist in the patent proprietor's infringement action, or to accept a potentially abusively excessive claim to license fees or other potentially abusive contractual conditions, in order to safely exclude the risk of an injunction’ (mn. 76).

SEP所有者此項(xiàng)義務(wù)的范圍以及專利所有人應(yīng)履行其提供信息的義務(wù)的具體內(nèi)容尚未被FCJ進(jìn)一步討論。此次FCJ只是談及了案件的具體情況和（不同尋常的是）侵權(quán)人的反應(yīng)。

The scope of the obligation and what is exactly needed to fulfil the patent proprietor’s duty to fulfil its information obligation has not been addressed further by the FCJ. The FCJ here merely refers to the specific circumstances of the case and (what is somehow new) the response of the infringer (mn. 79).

IV.   FRAND-terms and the non-discrimination prong of FRAND / FRAND條款和FRAND非歧視性的探討

FCJ的所持立場(chǎng)是市場(chǎng)并不需要一套統(tǒng)一的FRAND條款。尤其是SEP所有者并不需要向所有標(biāo)準(zhǔn)用戶授予相同的許可條件。相反，SEP所有者只被要求授予不扭曲貿(mào)易伙伴之間競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的條款和條件。因?yàn)榉磯艛喾ㄒ?guī)定的非歧視義務(wù)旨在使談判結(jié)果不受SEP所有者的市場(chǎng)支配地位的影響，并以平衡的方式考慮到締約雙方的利益（mn. 80）。

The FCJ takes the position that there would not only be one set of FRAND-terms. In particular the SEP-owner would not be required to grant equal conditions to all standard users. Rather the SEP-owner must only grant such terms and conditions that do not distort competition between trading partners. Because the non-discrimination obligation under antitrust laws would aim at enabling negotiation results which are not influenced by the market dominance of the SEP-owner and which take into account both contracting parties' interests in a balanced manner (mn. 80).

FCJ甚至還指出，SEP所有者可以授予不同的條款和條件。如果SEP所有者需要這樣做來維護(hù)自己的商業(yè)利益，這種行為是正當(dāng)?shù)摹＠?，如果SEP所有者必須接受較低的費(fèi)率，以便能夠從某些標(biāo)準(zhǔn)使用者那里獲得任何形式的補(bǔ)償，因?yàn)檫@些使用者受到國(guó)家機(jī)構(gòu)的保護(hù)，甚至可能對(duì)SEP所有者發(fā)起某種威脅，則SEP所有者（在給予該使用者較低的費(fèi)率之后）仍可自由地向其他標(biāo)準(zhǔn)用戶以標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的費(fèi)率實(shí)施許可（mn. 102）。

The FCJ even goes so far to state that the SEP-owner could grant different terms and conditions and that such a behaviour would be justified, if the SEP-owner needed to do that to safeguard its own commercial interests. For example, if an SEP-owner would have to accept lower rates in order to be able to get any sort of compensation from certain standard users as they are protected by national agencies who might even issue some sort of threat against the SEP-owner, the SEP-owner would still be free to request its regular rates from other standard users (mn. 102).

當(dāng)然，這有可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致市場(chǎng)參與者之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)被扭曲，但FCJ顯然接受了這一點(diǎn)，甚至沒討論其后果。FCJ重申，“一個(gè)合理的價(jià)格，通常不能客觀地確定，但只能通過（可能類似的）談判這一市場(chǎng)過程的結(jié)果來確定”。根據(jù)這一聲明，德國(guó)法院可以進(jìn)一步將其對(duì)（SEP所有者給被許可人的）報(bào)價(jià)是否實(shí)際符合FRAND的評(píng)估方面的工作減到最低，并繼續(xù)關(guān)注SEP所有者與第三方簽訂的其他許可協(xié)議。

That of course will likely lead to a distortion of competition between market players but the FCJ apparently accepts that without even addressing that consequence. The FCJ reiterates that “a reasonable price, regularly [is] not objectively established, but can be determined only as the result of (possibly similar) negotiated market processes”. Based on this statement, German courts could further limit their assessment of whether offered rates are in fact FRAND to a minimum and remain focussing on other licenses concluded by the SEP-owner with third parties.

V.   FRAND license obligations towards suppliers / 對(duì)供應(yīng)商的FRAND許可義務(wù)

在此案中，F(xiàn)CJ其實(shí)不必探討這一問題：拒絕向組件制造商授予許可將會(huì)對(duì)向該組件制造商的客戶所發(fā)起的禁令要求產(chǎn)生什么影響。然而，判決書中有幾個(gè)陳述支持向產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈中各方皆提供許可。尤其在mn. 70、74和80中, FCJ指出：“此外，標(biāo)準(zhǔn)兼容產(chǎn)品的制造商可能希望自己無論如何都可以使用SEP專利作為參照，即使僅僅通過基于合理?xiàng)l款的許可協(xié)議（ECJ，WRP 2015，1080 margin no.53，64-Huawei/ZTE）。”總體來說，這是此次判決中比較積極的一面。必須指出的是，F(xiàn)CJ多次提到了獲得許可的權(quán)利。

In the given case, FCJ also did not have to address the question what effect a refusal to grant licenses to component manufacturers would have on injunction claims being asserted against the customers of such component manufacturers. However, there are several statements in the judgement which support the license to all position. These are in particular mn. 70, 74 and 80. Here the FCJ states: “Moreover, the manufacturer of a standard-compatible product may expect that he may use the teaching of an SEP anyway - even if only on the basis of a license agreement on reasonable terms (ECJ, WRP 2015, 1080 margin no. 53, 64 - Huawei/ZTE).” Generally speaking, that is the more positive side of the judgement and it has to be noted that the FCJ refers to the right to a license several times.

這項(xiàng)裁決對(duì)初審法院判例法的全面影響仍有待觀察。然而，現(xiàn)在很明顯的是，在Sisvel vs. Haier一案德國(guó)聯(lián)邦法院所做出的判決之下，SEP實(shí)施者必須謹(jǐn)慎地審視他們的談判行為以避免他們?cè)诘聡?guó)專利侵權(quán)訴訟中的FRAND抗辯過程中出現(xiàn)意外“驚喜”。

The full implications of the ruling on the case law of the courts of first instance remains to be seen. However, what becomes immediately clear is that SEP implementers have to carefully consider their negotiation behaviour under the FCJ’s reasoning in Sisvel vs. Haier in order to avoid unexpected surprises regarding their FRAND defence in German patent infringement proceedings.

觀察 / Observations

FRAND原則是標(biāo)準(zhǔn)必要專利訴訟過程中不可忽視的原則，各個(gè)國(guó)家和地區(qū)的法院均通過其法律角度對(duì)FRAND原則進(jìn)行了進(jìn)一步的理解和適用，對(duì)當(dāng)事人雙方在專利許可談判過程中的行為作出了更多的要求。法院在審判過程中，也分析了雙方是否具有善意談判的表現(xiàn)，以及是否履行了誠(chéng)信談判的義務(wù)。

在西電捷通VS索尼的案件中，北京高級(jí)人民法院就曾做出雙方當(dāng)事人遲遲未能進(jìn)入正式的專利許可談判程序，過錯(cuò)在于專利實(shí)施方的判決，并提出由于權(quán)利人在標(biāo)準(zhǔn)必要專利上作出公平、合理、無歧視許可聲明，因此，標(biāo)準(zhǔn)必要專利侵權(quán)民事責(zé)任的承擔(dān)應(yīng)當(dāng)考慮雙方談判的過程和實(shí)質(zhì)條件，判斷由哪一方為談判破裂承擔(dān)責(zé)任。

美國(guó)法院也曾在判決中指明標(biāo)準(zhǔn)必要專利的專利權(quán)人在簽訂每個(gè)合同時(shí)都必須負(fù)有誠(chéng)信的善意和公平交易的潛在義務(wù)，即，專利權(quán)人必須以誠(chéng)信的態(tài)度發(fā)出FRAND要約，專利許可合同的達(dá)成也要求雙方保持善意的談判態(tài)度。

結(jié)合上文德國(guó)聯(lián)邦最高法院的判例，對(duì)FRAND原則中專利權(quán)人和專利實(shí)施者的行為和義務(wù)進(jìn)行了更為細(xì)致的規(guī)定?；谏鲜龇治觯瑢＠麢?quán)人應(yīng)向?qū)＠麑?shí)施者提供符合FRAND原則的明確的具體要約；而專利實(shí)施者在接到專利權(quán)人書面要約之后，應(yīng)及時(shí)履行回應(yīng)要約的義務(wù)，以避免被認(rèn)為沒有做到及時(shí)的誠(chéng)信回應(yīng)，沒有為獲得專利許可盡力。在協(xié)商談判暫時(shí)無法達(dá)成一致時(shí)，專利實(shí)施者也可通過提供善意的、合理的擔(dān)保來表達(dá)自己的誠(chéng)意。同時(shí)，對(duì)于FRAND原則下，具體的專利許可條件，專利權(quán)人和專利實(shí)施者應(yīng)重視針對(duì)不同國(guó)家和地區(qū)的法律規(guī)則和制度進(jìn)行研判，動(dòng)態(tài)監(jiān)控領(lǐng)域內(nèi)的實(shí)時(shí)動(dòng)向，做出更細(xì)致的評(píng)估，設(shè)計(jì)出更優(yōu)勢(shì)的策略和方案。

來源：IPRdaily中文網(wǎng)（iprdaily.cn）

作者：Stephan Dorn, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer Germany

Corin Gittinger, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer Germany

Yujing Wang（王玉婧）, PECC-China

Jinping Gong（龔津平）, CocreateIP Germany

編輯：IPRdaily王穎          校對(duì)：IPRdaily縱橫君

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